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Abstract
In this paper, we establish a convergence result for equilibria in systems
of social interactions with many locally and globally interacting players. As-
suming spacial homogeneity and that interactions between diﬀerent agents
are not too strong, we show that equilibria of systems with ﬁnitely many
players converge to the unique equilibrium of a benchmark system with in-
ﬁnitely many agents. We prove convergence of individual actions and of
average behavior. Our results also apply to a class of interaction games
(Morris 1997).
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Large diﬀerences in aggregate social or economic variables are often observed in the absence of
corresponding diﬀerences in fundamentals. To accommodate such phenomena, a model must
generate a multiplier that transforms small changes in exogenous variables into large changes
of endogenous variables. Models of social interactions are capable of displaying multiplier
eﬀects. In these models an agent’s behavior depends, among other things, on the choice of
other agents in some reference group and/or the empirical distribution of actions throughout
the whole population. In the presence of positive complementarities where the utility of
undertaking an action increases with the number of agents undertaking the same action, a
change in fundamentals has a direct eﬀect on the behavior of an agent and an indirect eﬀect
through the interaction with others that are of the same sign. If these complementarities are
powerful enough, small diﬀerences in fundamentals are ampliﬁed. As a result, signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent aggregate activities may emerge from slightly distinct fundamentals.
In many examples in the literature an agent’s utility is inﬂuenced, among other factors,
by the average behavior of the population. In this case, the modelling is more naturally
done in the context of an inﬁnite number of agents, where one can appeal to law of large
numbers. Horst and Scheinkman (2005) study a general model that allows for local and
global interactions and prove existence, uniqueness and homogeneity of equilibria for a class
of models with an inﬁnite number of agents. In this paper we show that for a class of these
models, the equilibrium in a system with an inﬁnite number of agents is the limit of equilibria
of large ﬁnite systems that naturally approximate the inﬁnite system. Our limit theorem can
be viewed as a justiﬁcation for the analysis of inﬁnite systems. As Horst and Scheinkman
(2005) did to establish uniqueness, we assume a form of spacial homogeneity and limits on the
strength of social interactions. The results in this paper establish convergence of equilibrium
actions of individuals and also the convergence of average actions. These results can be
applied also to certain interaction games (see Morris (1997)). Strictly speaking, our results
apply to games that satisfy the average action property, as deﬁned by Morris and Shin (2005)
- that is when the utility of a player depends on the average action of the other players.1
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 we recall the deﬁnition
of systems of social interactions and existence and uniqueness results for inﬁnite systems,
respectively. Section 4 states the main result of this paper: a convergence theorem for
equilibria of ﬁnite systems. The proof is given in Section 5.
1In principle, our results could also be extended to deal with the expected utility case. In fact in Horst and
Scheinkman (2005) we deal with utility functions with arbitrary dependence on the distribution of actions.
Convergence results covering this general case would however require substantial increases in the complexity
of the notation and analysis.
22 Systems of random social interactions
In this section we recall the deﬁnition of systems of random social interactions given by Horst
and Scheinkman (2005). Each agent is indexed by an a ∈ A, where A is a subset of the lattice
Zd of d-dimensional vectors with integer entries. An agent will choose an action xa from a
common compact and convex set of possible actions X. An action proﬁle x = {xa}a∈A is a
list of actions xb for each b ∈ A. The conﬁguration space
S :=
n
x = {xb}b∈A : xb ∈ X
o
of all action proﬁles is equipped with the product topology, and hence it is compact. The
utility function of the agent a ∈ A may also depend on the actions chosen by other agents
b ∈ A. In addition, it is random, that is, it also depends on the realization of a random
variable ϑa deﬁned on the (canonical) probability space (Ω,F,P). In short, agent a’s utility
is of the form
ˆ Ua(xa,{xb}b6=a,ϑa).
In models of social interactions, the inﬂuence of other agents’ actions on a player’s utility
appears in two distinct ways. The ﬁrst is the impact of the actions of a particular set of
neighbors. The second is through the distribution of actions throughout the whole popula-
tion. We call the former the local component of social interactions and the latter the global
component. To describe these distinct inﬂuences, and to allow for variable degrees of inﬂuence
on the utility of an agent by the choices of their neighbors, we write ϑa = (Ja,θa) for each
agent a ∈ A. The random variable θa describes a taste shock and assumes values in R. The
random variable Ja = (Ja,b)b6=a, takes values in RA. The realization of the random variable
Ja,b deﬁnes the eﬀect the choice of the neighbor b 6= a has on the utility of the agent a ∈ A.
To accommodate the global component, Horst and Scheinkman (2005) allowed the utility
function to depend also on the distribution of agents’ actions. To simplify our exposition
and proofs we will assume, as is often done in models of social interactions, that only the
average action %(x) associated with the action proﬁle x aﬀects utility. Not all proﬁles have
an empirical average, but we will deal with this problem below.
We assume that the utility function of the agent is of the form
ˆ Ua(xa,{xb}b6=a,Ja,θa) ≡ ˆ U(xa,{Ja,bxb}b6=a,%(x),θa). (1)
It has for arguments the actions chosen by the diﬀerent players and the empirical mean of
actions. The choice of these arguments reﬂects the fact that we think of the realizations of




b ∈ A : Ja,b 6= 0
o
.
3Diﬀerent realizations of the random variables Ja may yield diﬀerent peer groups, and so
diﬀerent interaction patterns may emerge. The actions xb of agents that do not belong to
N(a) aﬀect a’s optimal action only indirectly through their impact on the distribution %(x).
The representation of the utility function given by equation (1) is not necessarily unique, and
at this point it is only useful as an interpretation of the interaction patterns.
The special case Ja,b = 0 for all a,b ∈ A corresponds to a mean-ﬁeld interaction where an
agent’s utility depends on the actions taken by others only trough the distribution of actions.
If interactions are purely global the utility function takes the form
ˆ Ua(xa,{xb}b6=a,Ja,θa) ≡ ˆ U(xa,%(x),θa).
Continuous action versions of the models studied in Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Durlauf
(1996) may be viewed as mean-ﬁeld interactions. Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Durlauf
(1996) consider systems with ﬁnitely many agents and assume that an agent’s utility function
is of the form





xaEaxb + f(xa,θa) (2)
where Eaxb denotes the expectation of agent a about the behavior of agent b ∈ A. In partic-
ular, an agent’s utility does not depend on the actions taken by his neighbors, but only on
his expectation about their behavior. Brock and Durlauf (2001) argue that in their spatially
homogeneous setup, in equilibrium, all agents share the same expectations about the behav-
ior of their neighbors. This means that, in equilibrium, Eaxb = % for some % ∈ X and for all
a,b ∈ A. For |A| → ∞, assuming that taste shocks are i.i.d, consistency requires %(x) = % for
an equilibrium action proﬁle so a model with the alternative utility function
ˆ U(xa,%(x),θa) = u(xa) + xa%(x) + f(xa,θa). (3)
has equilibria that contain all equilibria of the original model. Hence, in the limit of an
inﬁnite set of agents, any property that is true for all equilibria of a model with utilities
deﬁned by (3), holds automatically for utility functions given by (2).
Example 2.1 A utility function of the form
ˆ Ua(xa,{xb}b6=a,Ja,θa) = u(xa) + xa X
b∈N(a)
Ja,bxb + f(xa,%(x),θa) (4)
captures a situation where an agent’s payoﬀ depends on the actual actions taken by his neigh-
bors rather than his expectation about his neighbors actions. Here, the random variables Ja,b
specify the eﬀect of an increase in the action by a neighbor b ∈ N(a) on the marginal utility
of the agent a ∈ A.
42.1 Inﬁnite systems of random social interactions
The general deﬁnition of a utility function given in equation (1) is not convenient for estab-
lishing the existence of an equilibrium in models with inﬁnitely many agents. An existence
proof typically requires continuity of the utility functions and compactness of the conﬁgu-
ration space S. In many interesting examples, the conﬁguration x ∈ S enters the utility
function of an agent a ∈ A both locally through the actions xb taken by his neighbors and
globally via the average behavior throughout the entire population. In case of an inﬁnite
number of agents, S is compact in the product topology, but if an agent’s utility function
depends on x through the empirical average %(x) in a non-trivial manner, it is not a contin-
uous function of x.2 In addition, a conﬁguration x does not necessarily have an empirical
average. To solve these diﬃculties, Horst and Scheinkman (2005) used a method introduced
in F¨ ollmer and Horst (2001) and Horst (2002), that treats the empirical distribution %(x) of
individual actions associated with x ∈ S as an additional parameter of the utility function.
Speciﬁcally, in models with inﬁnitely many agents individual utility functions are deﬁned as
a continuous map deﬁned on the extended state space S × X × Ω. Continuity of the utility
function then translates into a condition on the random variable Ja. The impact of agents
far away must decrease suﬃciently fast. In particular, continuity rules out the existence of a
“leader” whose actions aﬀect all agents equally.
We are now ready to deﬁne an inﬁnite system of random social interactions. This is a
slightly simpliﬁed version of the deﬁnition used in Horst and Scheinkman (2005).
Deﬁnition 2.2 A system of random social interactions is a vector
E = (A,P,X,(Ua)a∈A)
with the following components:
(i) A ⊂ Zd is the set of agents.
(ii) P is a probability measure on (Ω,F).
(iii) X ⊂ Rl is a common compact, convex, action space.
(iv) Ua : S × X × RA × R → R a measurable mapping of the form
Ua(xa,{xb}b6=a,%,Ja,θa) ≡ U(xa,{Ja,bxb}b6=a,%,θa),
2The class of continuous functions f : S → R which depend only on ﬁnitely many coordinates is dense in
the space C(S) of all continuous functions on S equipped with the topology of uniform convergence. Thus,
f ∈ C(S) depends on an action proﬁle x ∈ S, at least approximately, only through ﬁnitely many actions.
5and such that for P-a.e. pair (Ja,θa), the map
(x,%) 7→ Ua(xa,{xb}b6=a,%,Ja,θa)
is continuous and strictly concave in xa; the utility function of agent a ∈ A.
A-priori there is no consistency requirement between the conﬁguration x ∈ S and the
“empirical average” % in the deﬁnition of the utility function U. In particular, it is not neces-
sary that we can associate an empirical average with the proﬁle x. However, consistency will
be required in equilibrium. An equilibrium is a random action proﬁle g(J,θ) = {ga(J,θ)}a∈A
with empirical average %(J,θ) such that all agents play a best reply against their neighbors’






It should be emphasized that for equilibrium analysis it is equivalent to use the continuous
utility function U on the extended state space that involves the variables (x,%) or to use the
possibly discontinuous utility function ˆ U in (1) that depends only on the actions proﬁle x,
since, in equilibrium we will require the “forecast” of the average choice % to coincide with
the empirical average of the action proﬁle x. In terms of ˆ U all agents play a conditional best
reply against the actual actions taken by all the players, given their private taste shocks and
the interaction pattern so
ga(J,θ) = argmaxxa∈X ˆ U(xa,{gb(J,θ)}b6=a,Ja,θa) (a ∈ A).
To prove our limit results we will place further restrictions on E.
Assumption 2.3 The system of random social interactions satisﬁes:
(i) The set of agents is given by the d-dimensional integer lattice, that is, A = Zd
(ii) P is an ergodic probability measure on (Ω,F), that is the distribution of the random
vector
(J,θ) = (Ja,θa)a∈A
is stationary and satisﬁes a 0-1-law on the σ-ﬁeld of all shift invariant events.
(iii) There exists M ∈ N such that P[Ja,b = 0] = 1 for |a − b| > M.
The ﬁrst two items in this Assumption state that E is ergodic a property that was used in
Horst and Scheinkman (2005) to prove uniqueness of equilibria and to show, in particular, the
existence of averages %(x) associated with the candidate equilibrium actions x. The last item
6in the Assumption simpliﬁes the proofs and guarantees that the dependence of the utility of
an agent on the actions of other agents decays “fast enough.” In what follows we will always
maintain Assumption 2.3.
Our goal is to show that equilibria of inﬁnite systems can be viewed as approximations
of equilibria of ﬁnite, but large systems. In the following section we propose a way to embed
models with ﬁnitely many agents into inﬁnite systems. Our approach is analytically con-
venient for deriving properties of equilibrium actions when the number of agents tends to
inﬁnity.
2.2 Finite systems of social interactions
There are many ways in which ﬁnite systems can be embedded into inﬁnite systems and in
which inﬁnite systems can be approximated by ﬁnite ones. A natural approach is to consider
the increasing sequence {An}n∈N, An := [−n,n]d∩A, of ﬁnite sub-populations and investigate
convergence properties of equilibrium action proﬁles as the number of agents tends to inﬁnity.
In models with local interactions where an agent’s utility depends on the choices of neighbors,
there may be agents in An with neighbors not belonging to An. We therefore ﬁx a boundary
condition y ∈ S and assume that all the player b / ∈ An take the action yb. In such a situation










where the conﬁguration ˆ x coincides with x on An and with the boundary condition y on the
complement Ac
n. Furthermore, %n,y(x) denotes the average choice by the agents in An i.e.,
ˆ xb :=
(
xb if b ∈ An







For ﬁnite systems En,y = (An,X,P,Un,y) the question of existence of an equilibrium
gn,y = {g
n,y
a }a∈An follows from continuity and strict concavity of the utility functions along
with compactness and convexity of the action spaces via a standard ﬁxed point argument.
Uniqueness can be guaranteed under additional restrictions on the strength of interactions.
To prove a convergence result for the sequence of random variables {gn,y}n∈N we also need
an existence and uniqueness result for an equilibrium g = {ga}a∈A in the benchmark model
with inﬁnitely many agents. In a second step we prove almost sure convergence of {gn,y}n∈N
to g. In this sense, an inﬁnite system E can be viewed as an approximation of ﬁnite, but
large systems En,y.
73 Equilibria in inﬁnite systems of social interactions
This section recalls results on existence and uniqueness of equilibria in inﬁnite systems of
random social interactions established by Horst and Scheinkman (2005). If interactions are
purely local, existence of equilibria follows from continuity along with strict concavity of the
utility functions and compactness and convexity of the actions spaces by a standard ﬁxed
point argument. In the case of an inﬁnite number of locally and globally interacting agents
we have the additional requirement that, in equilibrium, the agents’ forecast of the average
choice must equal the actual average of actions, and the question of existence and uniqueness
requires additional assumptions. Unless the equilibrium action proﬁles display a form of
spatial homogeneity, there is no reason expect that the these proﬁles have an average. As a
result, we consider only homogeneous equilibrium action proﬁles. To this end, we denote by
Ta the a-fold iteration of the canonical shift operator on Ω.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A random variable g(J,θ) = {ga(J,θ)}a∈A is a homogeneous equilibrium for
the inﬁnite system E = (A,P,X,U) if:
(i) No agent has an incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy. That is, almost surely
ga(J,θ) = argmaxxa∈XU (xa,{gb(J,θ)}b6=a,%(g(J,θ)),Ja,θa) (a ∈ A). (7)
(ii) The action proﬁle g(J,θ) is homogeneous, i.e.,
ga(J,θ) = g0 ◦ Ta(J,θ). (8)
For a homogeneous equilibrium action proﬁle g the ergodic theorem shows that the asso-
ciated average action exists and is almost surely independent of the actual interaction pattern







ga(J,θ) = % P-a.s. (9)
In particular, the existence of an average action implicitly assumed in (7) is a property of
homogeneous equilibria, not a condition of equilibrium action proﬁles. Of course, homoge-
neous equilibria are unlikely to exist unless, as we assumed, agents’ utility functions and the
probabilistic structure of interaction patterns and taste shocks are themselves homogeneous.
3.1 Microscopic equilibria of inﬁnite systems
For inﬁnite systems the question of existence and uniqueness of equilibria can conceptually be
separated into two parts. The ﬁrst part consists of taking as given for each (J,θ) an empirical
8average of actions and asking whether some prescribed proﬁle of actions maximizes utility
of each agent when he takes as given the actions of his neighbors and the given empirical
average. The second part consists in checking whether the actions assigned to each agent
generate the prescribed average choice. To separate the two problems, Horst and Scheinkman
(2005) introduced the notion of microscopic equilibria.
Deﬁnition 3.2 An action proﬁle g(%,J,θ) = {ga(%,J,θ)}a∈A is a microscopic equilibrium
associated with % ∈ X if
ga(%,J,θ) = arg max
xa∈X
U(xa,{gb(%,J,θ)}b6=a,%,Ja,θa) P-a.s. (10)
for all a ∈ A. The equilibrium is homogeneous if
ga(%,·) = g0(%,·) ◦ Ta for all a ∈ A.
A microscopic equilibrium associated with % is an action proﬁle where each agent max-
imizes his utility given the actions taken by all the other agents and given the common
anticipated average % of actions throughout the entire system. What distinguishes a mi-
croscopic equilibrium g(%,J,θ) from an equilibrium is the fact that the empirical average
associated with the conﬁguration g(%,J,θ) does not necessarily coincide with %. Of course, a







ga(%∗,J,θ) = %∗ P-a.s. (11)
While the existence of a microscopic equilibrium for inﬁnite systems follows from stan-
dard arguments there is no guarantee that this equilibrium is homogenous. To the best of our
knowledge no general existence result for homogenous equilibrium in ergodic systems is avail-
able except for the case where E has a unique microscopic equilibrium associated with %. In
this case Lemma 15 of Horst and Scheinkman (2005) guarantees that g(%,·) is homogeneous.
3.2 Equilibria of inﬁnite systems
The proof of existence and uniqueness of equilibria in inﬁnite systems requires additional
assumptions on the strength of interactions between diﬀerent agents. We need to place a
qualitative bound on the dependence of an agent’s conditional optimal action on his neighbors’
choices and the perceived average behavior. These bounds can be speciﬁed in terms of agent
0’s best reply function
h0 ({xa}a6=0,%,J,θ) := arg max
x0∈X
U(x0,{xa}a6=0,%,J0,θ0). (12)
9Modulo shifts, the same bounds can then be applied to the conditional best reply function ha










The following deﬁnition allows us to measure the dependence of an agent’s best reply on
another agent’s action and the anticipated average action.
Deﬁnition 3.3 The best reply function h0 is Lipschitz continuous if there exist uniformly
bounded random variables (La)a∈A and L% such that






|xa − ya| + L%  
θ0
|ˆ % − ˜ %| P-a.s.
Given an interaction proﬁle J and a conﬁguration of taste shocks θ, the quantity La
may be viewed as a bound for the inﬂuence an action taken by the agent a ∈ A has on
the optimal choice of agent 0 ∈ A. In a similar manner, the random variable L% measures
the dependence of agents 0’s best reply on his expectation about the population behavior.3
Existence and uniqueness of equilibria can be established for systems E in which the agents
best reply functions satisfy the following Moderate Social Inﬂuence (MSI) condition in its
strong form.





La(J0,θ0) and α2 := sup
θ
L%(θ0).
We say that E satisﬁes the MSI condition, respectively, the MSI condition in its strong form,
if the constants La and L% can be chosen to satisfy
α1 ≤ α < 1 respectively α1 + α2 ≤ α < 1. (14)
The following existence and uniqueness result is a consequence of Proposition 18 and
Theorem 19 of Horst and Scheinkman (2005), and plays a crucial role in our proofs.
Theorem 3.5 A system of social interactions E that satisﬁes the Moderate Social Inﬂuence
condition in its strong form has a unique equilibrium. That is, there exists a unique (up to
3We may choose L
a = 0 for |a| > M because the agents interact locally only with their nearest neighbors,
due to Assumption 2.3 (iii). For suﬃciently smooth utility functions, L
a and L
% can be expresses in terms of
cross partial derivatives of U. We refer the reader to Section 4.3 in Horst and Scheinkman (2005) for examples.
10a set of measure zero) spatially homogeneous random vector g(J,θ) = {ga(J,θ)}a∈A whose







ga(J,θ) = %∗ P-a.s.
such that each agent plays a best reply against his neighbors actions and the perceived average
of actions %∗:
ga(J,θ) = ha ({gb(J,θ)}b6=a,%∗,J,θ}) P-a.s.
For ﬁnite systems equilibria always exist, and the associated average actions typically
depend on the realization of the random variables (J,θ). Our convergence result stated
below shows that the sequence of average actions converges to the average action of the
unique equilibrium of the inﬁnite system if the interaction between diﬀerent agents is not too
strong. In ﬁnite but large systems the average choice throughout the whole population can
thus be approximated by a deterministic quantity.
4 Approximation of large systems
In this section we will investigate convergence of the equilibria of a sequence {En,y}n∈N of
ﬁnite systems. Given the boundary condition y on An, we can always choose La = 0 for
a / ∈ An, and hence the strong MSI condition guarantees existence of a unique equilibrium
gn,y(J,θ) = {g
n,y
a (J,θ)}a∈An for the system En,y. It turns out that each individual action
and the average action in the equilibrium proﬁles {gn,y}n∈N converge to the individual and
average actions in the unique equilibrium of the inﬁnite system. More precisely, we have the
following result. The proof requires some preliminaries and will be given in Section 5.
Theorem 4.1 Let En,y = (An,X,P,Un,y) be ﬁnite systems of social interactions that satisfy
the Moderate Social Inﬂuence condition in its strong form.
(i) For any agent a ∈ A the sequence of equilibrium actions {g
n,y
a }n∈N converges almost
surely to the corresponding equilibrium action ga in the inﬁnite system.
(ii) The sequence of empirical averages {%n,y}n∈N converges almost surely to the empirical
average % associated with the equilibrium action g.
That is, the impact of a boundary on both the individual and average behavior vanishes when
the number of agents tends to inﬁnity.
11For inﬁnite systems with local and global interactions any approximation must take a
stand on what happens to agents at the “boundary” of the set An. However, for mean ﬁeld
system this care is not necessary. The approximating ﬁnite systems have exactly the same
utility functions as the inﬁnite system except that the argument is the empirical average in
the ﬁnite systems. Hence our Theorem 4.1 is a generalization of Proposition 5 in Glaeser and
Scheinkman (2001) for models in which an agent’s utility only depends on the mean of other
agents action and shocks are iid. We state this result as a corollary.
Corollary 4.2 Let E be a mean ﬁeld system. If L% ≤ α < 1 almost surely, then the sequence
of unique equilibria in Enconverges almost surely to the unique equilibrium of E.
5 Proof of the approximation result
In this section we prove our approximation result for large, but ﬁnite systems of social in-
teractions. The key is to establish macroscopic convergence, i.e., to prove that the sequence
of average actions converges almost surely to the average action associated with the unique
equilibrium of the inﬁnite system. To this end, we need to show that the impact of the
boundary condition on the equilibrium action g
n,y
a of the agent a ∈ An decreases to zero
uniformly in the agent’s distance to the boundary of An as n → ∞. The idea is to view g
n,y
a
as one component of the limit of a deterministic dynamic process starting in gn,x where the
agents myopically optimize their behavior in reaction to the choices of others in the previous
period, given the boundary condition y on Ac
n. In general such a process is not guaranteed to
converge. However, under our MSI condition convergence follows from, e.g., Proposition 4 in
Glaeser and Scheinkman (2001). In a second step we apply the quantitative bounds on the
impact of boundary conditions on individual equilibrium action to prove that, in the limit of
an inﬁnite set of agents, the average behavior is independent of boundary conditions. A third
step consists of showing that convergence of averages implies convergence of individual ac-
tions. Finally, we show that in large systems the average choice is almost surely independent
of the actual realization of taste shocks and interaction patterns.
5.1 Continuous dependence of microscopic equilibria on average actions
Before establishing convergence of equilibria, it is convenient to prove continuous dependence
of microscopic equilibria on the perceived average behavior.
Lemma 5.1 Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.1 the homogeneous microscopic equilibria
g(%,·) depend continuously on %. That is, for all a ∈ A and almost surely
lim
n→∞
ga(%n,·) = ga(%,·) if lim
n→∞
%n = %.
12Proof: Since g(%,·) is a homogeneous microscopic equilibrium,
g0(%n,·) = h0 ({ga(%n,·)},%n,·) and ga(%n,·) = g0(%n,·) ◦ Ta
where Ta denotes the a-fold iteration of the canonical shift operator. Thus, Lipschitz conti-
nuity of the best reply function yields
|g0(%n,·) − g0(%,·)| ≤ |h0 ({ga(%n,·)}a6=0,%n,·) − h0 ({ga(%n,·)}a6=0,%,·)|
+|h0 ({ga(%n,·)}a6=0,%,·) − h0 ({ga(%,·)}a6=0,%,·)|
≤ L%(·)|% − %n| +
X
a∈A
La(·)|g0(%n,·) ◦ Ta − g0(%,·) ◦ Ta|,
and so our weak interaction condition shows that
|g0(%n,·) − g0(%,·)| ≤
1
1 − α
|%n − %| P-a.s.
2
Proposition 18 of Horst and Scheinkman (2005) guarantees that for a homogeneous mi-
croscopic equilibrium action proﬁle g(%,·) the associated average action is almost surely inde-
pendent of the realization of the random variable (J,θ). The ergodic theorem yields a P-null







ga(%,J,θ) = µ[%] for all (J,θ) ∈ N c
%.
Continuous dependence of microscopic equilibria on average choices allows us to show that
the set N% can actually be chosen independently of %.







ga(%,J,θ) = µ[%] for all (J,θ) ∈ N c and each % ∈ X.
Proof: By Lemma 35 in Horst and Scheinkman (2005) that map % 7→ µ[%] is continuous and
hence uniformly continuous because X is compact. Thus, for any  > 0 there exists δ > 0
such that
|µ[%] − µ[ˆ %]| ≤

2
if |% − ˆ %| < δ.
Furthermore, there exists %1,...,%n() ∈ X such that X is contained in the union of all the δ-








ga(%i,J,θ) = µ[%i] for all (J,θ) / ∈ N%i.




























+  = .
A reverse inequality holds for the lim inf. This proves the assertion, since  > 0 is arbitrary.
2
5.2 Impact of the boundary conditions
We now establish a quantitative bound on the impact of boundary conditions on individual
equilibrium actions in ﬁnite systems.
Proposition 5.3 Let x,y ∈ S. Under the assumption of Theorem 4.1 there exists, for every
 > 0, some constants N,k ∈ N, that do not depend on x,y, such that
|gn,x
a (J,θ) − gn,y
a (J,θ)| < 
for all (J,θ) ∈ N c, each n ≥ N and every a ∈ An−k.
Proof: We ﬁx a pair (J,θ) ∈ N c of interaction patterns and taste shocks and recall that
Ta denotes the canonical a-fold shift operator on A. To simplify the notation, we suppress
the dependence of equilibrium actions, best reply functions, etc. on (J,θ). We assume with
no loss of generality that the diameter of the action set is at most one, and consider only the
case M = 1 of a nearest neighbor interaction. Similar arguments apply for arbitrary M ∈ N.
Our idea is then to view the equilibrium action g
n,y
a as the result of a sequential myopic
best reply dynamics when in every period the agents chose their optimal actions in reaction
to the choices of all the other players in the previous period, given the boundary condition y
on Ac










a if a ∈ An






t ,·) ◦ Ta if a ∈ An
ya if a / ∈ An
for t ≥ 1 where %n
t denotes the average associated with the actions Gn
t (a) taken by the agents
a ∈ An at time t. In the ﬁrst period t = 1 only the 2d(n−1)d−1 agents on the boundary of An
change their actions. The resulting impact on the average choice is of the order n−1. In the
second period all agents react to the change of the average. In addition, all the agents that
are at most 2 away from the boundary modify their choices in reaction to changes of their
14neighbors actions, etc. By Proposition 4 in Glaeser and Scheinkman (2001) the sequence
{Gn
t }t∈N converges to the unique equilibrium gn,y for En,y because the ﬁnite system satisﬁes
our MSI condition. In terms of the quantities
Ln
t (a) := Gn

















The goal is thus to establish an upper bound for the random variables Ln




t (a)| is small whenever n is large enough. To this end, we proceed in four steps.
Step i) We ﬁrst introduce the random variables La,b := Lb−a ◦ Ta that measure the
impact the previous action of the agent b has on agent a’s current best reply. Since
Gn
t+1(a) = h0 ({Gn
t (b)}b6=a,%n
t ) ◦ Ta and Gn



























a ∈ An : min
b/ ∈An
|a − b| ≤ t

for the set of all agents that are at most t away from the boundary of An. Furthermore, we










αt+1 (t = 1,2,...)
where α = α1 + α2 < 1 denotes the bound on the impact of other agents’ choices on an
individual player’s optimal action. In the next step we show that the following estimate for
the random variables Ln
t (a) and Ln
t in terms of the quantities λn












Step ii) We prove (15) by induction. For t = 1 the assertion follows from the MSI
condition along with the fact that the diameter of the action space is at most one. Hence
15we assume that (15) holds for all t ≤ T. Consider then the case a / ∈ An
T+1 so that b / ∈ An
T
for all the neighbors b ∈ N(a). In this case the impact of the boundary condition on the
agent’s action at time T is felt only indirectly through its impact on the average choice. The


















If a ∈ An
T+1 then b ∈ An
T for at least one of the agent’s neighbors b ∈ N(a). In such a situation
the impact of the boundary condition on a is felt both directly through its impact on some


















T + αT+1 (17)
≤ λn
T+1 + αT+1.

























To this end, observe ﬁrst that |An| = (2n + 1)d. For n ≥ t the number of agents that are at
most t away from the boundary can thus be estimated by
|An
t | = (2n + 1)d − (2(n − t) + 1)d ≤ ˆ Ktdnd−1
16where the constant b K < ∞ depends only on the dimension d of the integer lattice. Hence we











t−1 + ˆ Kαttd
n
≤ α2λn














1 is of the order n−1 there exists a constant ˜ K such that
λn









≤ ˜ Kαt1 + td+1
n
.
By the quotient criteria K := ˜ K
P








Step iv) We are now ready to establish an upper bound on the impact of the boundary






















This shows that uniformly in a ∈ An the impact of the boundary condition on the agents’
equilibrium actions converges to zero as the number of agents tends to inﬁnity. 2
Remark 5.4 Our estimate (18) shows that the impact of the boundary condition on equilib-
rium actions can de decomposed into two parts. The global impact through the dependence of
choice on average actions decreases linearly as n → ∞. The local impact through the depen-
dence of neighbors’ actions decreases exponentially with an agent’s distance to the boundary.
17The same arguments as in the previous proposition can also be applied to microscopic
equilibria.
Corollary 5.5 Let gn,x(%,·) be the unique equilibrium conﬁguration of En,x with boundary
condition x if all the agents optimize their behavior under the assumption that the average
action is given by %. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.1 there exists, for every  > 0,
some constants N,k ∈ N such that
|gn,x
a (%,J,θ) − gn,y
a (%,J,θ)| <  P-a.s.
for all n ≥ N and each a ∈ An−k. The constants k and N are independent of the boundary
conditions and the perceived average action.
The fact that the impact of boundary conditions on individual equilibrium actions in
ﬁnite systems decreases to zero uniformly in the players’ distance to the boundary of the
set An allows us to prove that accumulation points of empirical averages are almost surely
independent of the boundary conditions.
Corollary 5.6 Let gn,x(J,θ) be the unique equilibrium conﬁguration of En,x with boundary
condition x given (J,θ), and let %n,x(J,θ) be the associated average action. Any accumulation
point of the sequence {%n,x(J,θ)}n∈N is almost surely independent of x.
Proof: The sequence {%n,x(J,θ)}n∈N takes values in the compact set X, and so there exists
a subsequence {nk}k∈N and a constant %x that may both depend on the realizations of the




In order to show that %x does not depend on x, we ﬁx a second boundary condition, y ∈ S,
and consider the sequence of empirical averages {%n,y(J,θ)}n∈N associated with the unique
equilibrium proﬁles {gn,y(J,θ)}n∈N. This sequence converges along a suitable subsequence




























This shows that the sequence {%n,y(J,θ)}n∈N converges along the entire sequence {nk}k∈N to
%x(J,θ). Hence any accumulation point of the sequence of average actions is independent of
boundary conditions. 2
185.3 From average to individual convergence
We now show that convergence of empirical averages implies convergence of individual equilib-
rium actions. The proof is based on an interplay between microscopic equilibria and equilibria
for ﬁnite systems and the interplay between microscopic equilibria in ﬁnite and inﬁnite sys-
tems. More precisely, the vector of equilibrium actions gn,x(J,θ) of the ﬁnite system En,x
with associated average action %n,x(J,θ) may be viewed as the unique microscopic equilibrium
conﬁguration gn,x(%n,x(J,θ),J,θ) where all the agents in An optimize their behavior under
the assumption that the average action is given by %n,x(J,θ), i.e.,
gn,x
a (J,θ) = gn,x
a (%n,x(J,θ),J,θ) for all a ∈ An. (19)
By analogy, for any %, the microscopic equilibrium g(%,J,θ) of the inﬁnite system E can
be regarded as the microscopic equilibrium gn,g(%,J,θ)(%,J,θ) of ﬁnite systems with boundary
conditions g(%,J,θ):
ga(%,J,θ) = gn,g(%,J,θ)
a (%,J,θ) for all a ∈ A and each n ∈ N. (20)
Proposition 5.7 Assume that the sequence of average actions {%n,x(J,θ)}n∈N associated
with the unique equilibria gn,x(J,θ) of the ﬁnite systems En,x converges to %(J,θ) along some
subsequence {nk}k∈N and let g(%(J,θ),J,θ) be the microscopic equilibrium action proﬁle of the
inﬁnite system associated with %(J,θ). The equilibrium action proﬁles of the ﬁnite systems




a (J,θ) = ga (%(J,θ),J,θ) for any a ∈ A.
In particular, accumulation points of the sequence {(gn,x(J,θ),%n,x(J,θ))}n∈N of equilibria and
associated empirical distributions are almost surely independent of the boundary condition.
Proof: We regard gn,x(J,θ) as the unique equilibrium action proﬁle gn,x (%n,x(J,θ),J,θ,) of




a (%n,x(J,θ),J,θ) − gnk,x
a (%(J,θ),J,θ)| = 0 for all a ∈ A




a (%(J,θ),J,θ) − ga (%(J,θ),J,θ)| = 0. (21)
In view of (20) the speciﬁc choice of the boundary condition g = g (%(J,θ),J,θ) yields
ga (%(J,θ),J,θ) = gn,g
a (%(J,θ),J,θ) for all n ∈ N. (22)
19Applying Corollary 5.5 to % = %(J,θ) we obtain for any  > 0, constants N,k ∈ N such that
almost surely
|gnk,x
a (%(J,θ),J,θ) − gn,g
a (%(J,θ),J,θ)| <  (23)
for all n ≥ N and each a ∈ An−k. This proves the convergence in (21), due to (22). 2
5.4 Proof of Theorem 4.1
To ﬁnish the proof of Theorem 4.1 we ﬁrst recall from Lemma 5.2 that there exists a set N of
measure zero such that for any % and every pair (J,θ) / ∈ N of interaction patterns and taste
shocks, the empirical average associated with the microscopic equilibrium with respect to %
exists and is independent of (J,θ). For every such pair it follows from Propositions 5.3 and 5.7
that any accumulation point (gx(J,θ),%x(J,θ)) of the sequence {(gn,x(J,θ),%n,x(J,θ))}n∈N of
equilibrium action proﬁles and associated empirical averages is independent of the boundary
condition:
gx
a(J,θ) ≡ ga(J,θ) and %x(J,θ) ≡ %(J,θ). (24)
It remains to prove that the average %(J,θ) does not depend on (J,θ) and that %(J,θ) is the
empirical average associated with the unique equilibrium of the inﬁnite system.
To this end, we consider the average action %n,g(J,θ)(J,θ) associated with the equilib-
rium action proﬁle gn,g(J,θ)(J,θ) of the ﬁnite system En,g(J,θ) with boundary condition g(J,θ)




a (J,θ) = ga(%(J,θ),J,θ)
for every a ∈ A. Since gn,g(J,θ)(J,θ) may be viewed as the unique equilibrium action proﬁle in
En,g(J,θ) if the agents optimize their behavior under the assumption that the average action
is given by %n,g(J,θ)(J,θ) we have
gn,g(J,θ)(J,θ) = gn,g(J,θ)(%n,g(J,θ)(J,θ),J,θ).
In view of (20) similar arguments as in the proofs of Lemma 5.1 show that
|gnk,g(J,θ)
a (J,θ) − ga(%(J,θ),J,θ)| < 



























ga(%(J,θ), ˆ J, ˆ θ) = µ[%(J,θ)]. (26)
Choosing ( ˆ J, ˆ θ) = (J,θ) in (26) we see that the limit in (25) exists along the whole sequence
and that %(J,θ) satisﬁes the ﬁxed point condition
% = µ[%].
The assumption of moderate social inﬂuence guarantees that this map a unique ﬁxed point,
due to Lemma 35 in Horst and Scheinkman (2005). This shows that %(J,θ) is almost surely
independent of (J,θ). 2
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we established a convergence result for equilibria in systems of social interac-
tions when the number of agents growth to inﬁnity. We assumed that the inﬁnite system
satisﬁes an ergodicity property. Under a moderate social inﬂuence condition, which restricts
the inﬂuence of an agent’s choices on the optimal decisions of other agents, the ﬁnite and
inﬁnite systems have a unique equilibrium. We showed that the equilibria of ﬁnite systems
converge almost surely to the equilibrium of the inﬁnite systems. The convergence takes place
both locally, i.e. at the level of individual choices and globally, i.e. at the level of average
actions. Our convergence result can thus be seen as a justiﬁcation for the analysis of inﬁnite
systems.
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